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ABSTRACT 
Security relations with the US have been critical for Turkey. Cold War 
strategic imperatives dictated typical bandwagoning policies, although 
disagreements and frictions were present at times. In the 2000s a 
combination of domestic developments and rapidly changing regional 
security patterns have resulted in a more assertive Turkish regional 
security policy, which for many represents a departure from traditional 
Kemalist principles. This paper attempts to assess the current course of 
Turkish regional security engagement and the extent to which relations 
between the USA and Turkey are subject to major change. The analytical 
context accounts for the impact of domestic, regional and global levels. 
The empirical focus is on Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian sectarian 
conflict and on the trajectory of the bilateral relations with Israel.  
Keywords: US-Turkish relations, Israel, Middle East, Eastern 
Mediterranean, regional security 
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The US and Turkey in the fog  
of Regional Uncertainty 
 
1. Introduction 
Long gone the days when US-Turkish relations have been subject to Cold 
War pressures. On the US side, Turkey is no longer a Cold War outpost to 
be held secure at all cost and with every means. Although both are 
NATO allies and bilateral cooperation is valued, the relationship has 
been subject to changing domestic auditoria, changing regional 
aspirations as well as regional and global power reconfigurations. It 
looks like both have become more realistic about the strengths and 
limits of their relationship and the demands they make upon each other 
have become less straightforward.  
Turkey is changing and it is changing fast with the Kemalist secular 
tradition being challenged as the dominant identity source. The ruling 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been successful in the struggle 
for power against the old secularist guard. In foreign policy, Turkey has 
adopted a much more Ankara-centric approach to the Middle East and 
Easetern Mediterranean, embodied in the ideologically driven 
“Davutoglu doctrine” while the US under Obama has been attempting to 
focus its strategic gaze in East Asia exhibiting a reduced appetite for a 
more direct involvement in the Middle East. Both have been rather 
unprepared for the changes suddenly unfolding in the region. The main 
argument in this paper is that in a rather unchartered regional security 
setting, the variety of actors, roles, and perceived interests have resulted 
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in considerable degrees of security anxiety and policies often without 
basic direction, coherence and well assessed goals. One very 
fundamental question - albeit hard to answer at this juncture – is 
whether Turkey under AKP would increasingly find itself at odds with the 
West should it continue to pursue a “neo-Ottoman” course.
1
 
The following discussion attempts to assess the course of security 
relations between the USA and Turkey against a highly uncertain Eastern 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern subsystem. The focus is firstly on the 
current reading of US foreign policy priorities and preferences, its 
reluctant focus on Eastern Mediterranean, and its uncertain engagement 
in the wider Middle East. Secondly, Turkey’s changing regional security 
setting and the domestic anxieties and pressures, which are present at 
the effort of the AKP government to revise its regional stance in a rather 
radical manner is discussed. Special attention is given to the 
deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations and to Turkish policy in Syria 
and the extent to which they do impact upon regional security dynamics 
and dilemmas.  
2.  Washington’s shifting focus under Barack Obama 
In 2008, the Economist declared that the Bush foreign policy doctrine 
will not last in its present form, but nor will it disappear altogether.
2
 Five 
years later, the reality is that, despite domestic challenges and limited 
resources, President Obama has succeeded in generating some change. 
A much stronger focus on strengthening international institutions and 
                                                 
1 Many believe that the AKP leadership seeks to reverse the secular legacy of Mustafa Kemal 
by eliminating restrictions on Islam and undercutting “the old judicial and military order that 
guarded against the Islamization of Turkey” (Fradkin and Libby 2013). 
2 ‘Can the Bush doctrine last?’, The Economist, March 29th-April 4th 2008. 
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galvanizing collective action
3
, has meant that the President’s apparent 
conviction that universal values and practical geopolitics exist in the 
same tension as war and peace amounts to a belief-system situated 
within an “amalgam of pragmatism and Niebuhrian realism” (Milne 
2012: 939). In practice, Obama tried to undo at least some of the 
damage inflicted to US foreign policy by the Bush Administration and 
more or less he “has handled the terrain deftly”
4
. An enormous 
challenge, especially when one must try to balance the interests 
between adversaries and allies, deal with a very hostile Republican 
Congress and need to manage the global recession both at home and 
abroad. 
From 2001, the US went through a decade of massive foreign 
commitments and interventions, which proved enormously expensive in 
blood and treasure as well as highly unpopular around the world. This 
overextension was followed by a financial crisis that drained American 
power. The result was a foreign policy that was insolvent. Obama 
assumed power determined to pare down excess commitments, regain 
goodwill and refocus the US on core missions to achieve a more stable 
and sustainable global position. He came into office with a set of beliefs 
about the world that he has tried to act upon. He believed Iraq was an 
expensive mistake and a major distraction and he drew down US forces 
from 142,000 in early 2009 to zero by the end of 2011. In Afghanistan, 
he sought to end the more expensive aspects of the mission, focusing 
the fight on counterterrorism, which he embraced with ferocity, in 
Pakistan, Yemen as well as Afghanistan; and this against a doctrinal shift 
                                                 
3 The White House, National Security Strategy, 27 May 2010. 
4 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Strategist’, Time, January 30, 2012, p. 16. 
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that allowed for a rediscovery of multilateralism and a kind of leadership 
aware or the rise of countries like China, India and Brazil as well as of the 
limits in terms of US resources and influence. By understanding the 
dynamics of globalization and interdependence and how far they are 
responsible for shaping the evolution of the international system - 
where the limitations of US power politics have been acknowledged - 
Obama chose the strategic significance of cooperative efforts with both 
allies and non-allies to combat transnational threats. Bruce Jones (2009: 
69) has illustrated this policy as an example of ‘cooperative realism’.  
By the time of his reelection in November 2012, Obama’s military 
policies and rhetoric had amounted to a doctrine and represented a 
major shift in that “Europe is no longer the key region shaping American 
grand strategy” (Stepak and Whitlark 2012: 47). Nor does the Middle 
East rank high in the US foreign policy agenda (Gerger 2013: 300). 
Instead, the focus has been increasingly on the Asia-Pacific region. This 
emphasis is reflected in the Defense Department’s January 2012 
“strategic guidance” document, which states that, “US economic and 
security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc 
extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean 
region and South Asia”.
5
 The White House has been trying to pivot the 
US strategic gaze from Europe (and the Middle East) to China and Asia, 
in an effort for the US to become the central power broker in China’s 
external relations in Asia (Niblett 2012: 1). Indeed, Obama’s big first-
term goal was to close the military accounts in the Muslim world so that 
the US could refocus its attention on the Asia-Pacific region. The US 
                                                 
5 ‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf.   
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troop presence in Afghanistan concludes in 2014. But the scaling down 
there and in Iraq has already freed up resources to go east. Leon Panetta 
said the US would deploy 60 per cent of its naval assets in the Asia-
Pacific and 40 per cent in the Atlantic – from the previous 50:50 
division.
6
 It is a vivid acknowledgement of the reality that Europe is no 
longer topping the agenda, that the US resources are finite, and an 
appreciation that the international environment is far from 
straightforward as some vocal ideologues in US (and elsewhere) would 
have it appear (Milne 2012: 935).  
The realization that America’s priorities have been shifting, was further 
underscored on 8 November 2012 – only a day after the reelection of 
Obama – when the White House announced that the President’s first 
overseas trip would be to Southeast Asia.
7
 A few years ago it would have 
been hard to imagine a freshly elected president heading straight for 
southeast Asia – and in the midst of negotiations to avert a fiscal cliff. 
Yet, Obama’s first itinerary comprised three of China’s neighbours 
(Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand), for the larger game is and will 
always be for some time about China.  
If Obama is successful, US’ ‘rebalancing’ to Asia will be his chief 
diplomatic legacy in 2016. If the Middle East is true to form, however, he 
will be continually wrenched back into the ancient regional quagmires. 
As we are reminded by the Syrian imbroglio, “the tug of war between 
                                                 
6 According to the Pentagon, this will include one aircraft carrier, four standard destroyers, 
three Zumwalt destroyers, ten Littoral combat ships and two submarines – as well as the 
new base in Darwin, Australia that will host 2,500 marines. Edward Luce, ‘Obama’s road to 
Xanadu runs through Jerusalem’, Financial Times, 19 November 2012. 
7 Melissa Eddy, ‘Germans feeling ignored by Obama’, International Herald Tribune, 10-11 
November 2012. 
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Middle East realities and the unfolding strategy in the Pacific is likely to 
be the chief tension through Obama’s second term”.
8
 Middle East and 
Eastern Mediterranean are not realities that Washington can afford to 
ignore, for they always return with a vengeance. 
3. The realities of regional fog 
Eastern Mediterranean has been a meeting point of strategic dynamics, 
which involve state as well as sub-state actors and strategic 
realignments caused by several countries’ security search, with Turkey 
being a case in point. The US has been casting a wide political and 
security shadow in the region since the end of the Second World War. 
The cornerstone of the US Middle Eastern strategy has for some time 
been the two major regional triangular relationships: US-Turkey-Israel 
and US-Egypt-Israel (Alterman and Malka 2012: 111). This arrangement 
has traditionally enhanced the US interests such as maintaining a stable 
regional balance of power, securing the energy supply of the West and 
ameliorating Israel’s security dilemma through boosting its ties to major 
littoral powers. Thus the US was allowed more freedom in partly shaping 
and controlling the development of the regional order and providing the 
foundation for regional stability (ibid. 2012: 114). In the case of Turkish-
Israeli relations, they took a strategic turn with the signing of a military 
cooperation agreement in 1996
9
 and were considered as an essential 
element of the Turkish-US strategic bond. It highlighted Turkey’s 
importance in the Middle East as Israel’s partner, while as a side 
                                                 
8 Luce, ‘Obama’s road to Xanadu’. 
9 The agreement allowed, among other, the Israeli Air Force to use Turkish airspace for 
training, thus providing Israel with much needed strategic depth. By 2001, the US military 
was participating in trilateral air force and search-and-rescue exercises with Israel and 
Turkey. 
  7 
payment it generated strong support from the powerful Jewish lobby in 
Washington on issues that were important to Turkey, such as countering 
the influence of the Armenian lobby and supporting Turkey’s demands 
for advanced military hardware in the US Congress (Aydin 2009: 134-
135). In the case of the Egyptian-Israeli partnership, common interests 
included countering Iranian activism, combating terrorism and religious 
extremism and maintaining some form of stability by balancing out any 
threatening behaviours. 
Since the late 2000s, however, the strategic geography the US helped to 
shape has been crumbling (Alterman and Malka 2012: 111) with the 
advent to power in Turkey, Egypt and elsewhere of political forces that 
do not seem to share the same agenda as their predecessors. 
Established assumptions and relationships have been challenged, and 
not as a product of US preferences. After nearly two decades of relative 
predictability, the two-triangles-setting has been wearing off and since 
the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions a new Middle East is colliding with the old 
order. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has long defined the region 
exploded in another spasm of violence, with the November 2012 Gaza 
Strip eruption. Although, the crisis looked like a rerun of past turmoil, 
this time, the context has been different. Traditional actors had new 
calculations, and each tested the limits of the order in the wake of ‘Arab 
Spring’ regime changes.
10
 
                                                 
10 The eight-day conflict between Hamas and Israel ended in a cease-fire. The repercussions 
for Israel and Arab leaders have been major. Israel, despite its superior military and 
technological advantage as well as its modern Iron Dome system, was unable to intercept all 
the longer-range Fajr-5 rockets fired from Gaza that reached Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The 
‘invisibility’ of Israel has been in doubt and has also emboldened other groups towards Israel 
- most notably Hezbollah. The crisis has also been a political setback for Arab leaders who 
have remained silent and the Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, Hamas has gained 
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The AKP government in Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood 
government in Egypt have been openly quite critical of the pre-existing 
arrangements. They have openly sought greater distance from Israel and 
adopted increasingly independent positions vis-à-vis and beyond the 
reach and influence of the US. The demise of ancient regional strategic 
regime is seen widely as having rather negative implications for the US 
strategy and for Israeli security.
11
 In Ankara and in Cairo, the new 
governing elites have already been seeking to rebalance their 
relationships with Israel by lessening economic ties and unraveling 
existing security arrangements.
12
 Without doubt, Israel’s neighborhood 
has become more hostile. One player it could count on to contain 
Hamas, Egypt has a new Islamist regime.
13
 In Lebanon, the Hezbollah 
party-cum-militia holds sway. Jordan’s King Abdullah is under increasing 
political and economic pressure. Syria is in the throes of a war that has 
shattered the calm on the border with Israel and whose outcome will be 
critical to the regional status quo.
14
 Moreover, such developments come 
at a time when the US grave economic situation undermines 
Washington’s ability to pursue effective strategies and to shape 
                                                                                                                                            
popularity among Palestinians and Muslims for not succumbing to yet another Israeli 
bombardment. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, ‘Iran and Hamas Winners in Gaza Conflict’, 26 
November 2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2012/al-monitor/gazawarregionaleffects.html.  
11 Since the December 2008-January 2009 war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, Turkey 
excluded the Israeli Air Force from the annual Anatolian Eagle air exercise. In response to the 
Turkish decision, the US cancelled its participation (Alterman and Malka 2012: 119). 
12 While the Egyptian government have suggested they would not abandon the Camp David 
Accords, they have signaled its belief that Israel has not fulfilled its obligations and a 
thorough renegotiation is necessary. The announcement by the Egyptian General Petroleum 
Corporation in April 2012 that it would cease selling natural gas to Israel is a modest 
example of the deterioration of Egyptian-Israeli strategic cooperation (Alterman and Malka 
2012: 120-121).  
13 In the November 2012 crisis, Hamas negotiated the cease-fire with Israel through the 
agency of Cairo. This may represent an important step toward Hamas becoming a more 
recognized player. ‘Hamas chief makes first visit to Gaza Strip’, International Herald Tribune, 
8-9 December 2012. 
14 ‘Old battles, new Middle East’, The Economist, November 24, 2012. 
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outcomes and set agendas in a region that is going through the most 
unsettling reshuffling since the early years of the Cold war. The ‘Arab 
Spring’ process of regime change and the advent to power of less secular 
political forces has been unexpected and hence more troubling for 
external actors. 
In general, however, the Obama Administration demonstrated caution 
and its approach has remained constant to date. Each revolution has 
been met with trepidation – for shifts in power in the Arab world can be 
unsettling as they are easily transformed into the settling of scores, 
political vendettas and undue reprisals – followed by rhetorical support 
and by deliberation on the best way to facilitate regime change without 
committing US resources. At the end of the day, Washington’s response 
has been defined on a case-by-case basis without the traditional 
ideological inclinations or instinctual reactions contaminating the 
decision-making process (Milne 2012: 941-2). It is unclear, though, what 
tools the United States has to affect the course of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 
the medium run. Where, more action is needed absence is offered. The 
US (and Europe) seems lacking the will and the power to intervene in the 
much more strategically important Syrian imbroglio. For now, at least, 
the key event in the Middle East for a generation is largely beyond the 
US’ influence (Miller 2012: 17). Overall, American influence in the Arab 
world has seriously waned. The new regimes in the Middle East are and 
will most probably remain cool to Washington because of religious 
pressures; because the Middle East peace process is stalled if not dead; 
and because elections are producing populists who court their publics by 
thumbing their noses at Washington. 
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4. US-Turkish relations in unchartered waters 
Turkey’s geostrategic importance to Washington has always been high. 
During the Cold War, “Turkey was a strategic imperative of the US” 
(Friedman 2012: 2). The fundamental feature that has determined the 
course of the relationship has been its predominantly security-oriented 
nature,
15
 without a solid social and economic basis and hence without a 
clearly defined list of priorities: “more like a conjectural cooperation 
programme.”
16
 By most accounts, it is Turkey’s strategic location, which 
dictates that its importance to Washington is primarily a function of US 
objectives in Turkey’s neighboring regions. Turkey has been seen as one 
of the most important forward bases through which US policies in the 
wider Middle East region would be implemented, and has provided the 
US with much needed strategic depth in its regional engagement policies 
(Gerges 2013: 317). This assessment has rendered the relationship 
vulnerable and dependent on circumstantial strategic security 
assessments of the interests involved (GRF 2011: 19), while the 
profound asymmetry of power is said to be responsible for Turkey’s 
distrust of the US (ibid.: 6).  
Given an extremely complex geography of strategic requirements, it is 
not surprising that US-Turkish relations have been subject to great 
pressure in recent years. Turkey is freed from its fear of Russia. A 
fundamental pillar of Turkish foreign policy was gone, and with it, 
Turkish strategic dependence on the US (Friedman 2012: 2). For Ankara 
                                                 
15 After almost 50 years of alliance the trade volume has remained rather low. It is 
noteworthy, that despite Turkey’s impressive economic performance since the mid-2000s, 
trade with the US reached only $15 billion in 2010 and remains overly dependent on large 
US defense and aircraft sales (CFR 2012: 11). 
16 See ‘Ankara and Washington: What is the problem?’, Today’s Zaman, 2 November 2012, 
http://todayszaman.com/news/296454. 
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in the 2000s, there was an immediate existential threat no more, but its 
neighborhood was becoming (more) unstable and the US, following the 
2003 military campaign against and the subsequent occupation of Iraq, 
was no longer a predictable partner. In Washington, Turkey’s 
geopolitical value was in doubt following the fall out over Iraq. For the 
US Pentagon – Ankara’s most ardent advocate - Turkey’s strategic 
importance is only valued in the context of its availability to US troops 
(Park 2003: 9).  
At the same time, in the eyes of many Turks the need for strategic 
support from the West and Israel had profoundly decreased and the 
relationship with the United States could prove “more dangerous than 
the threat an alliance with the United States was meant to stave off” 
(Friedman 2012: 2-3). In the second half of the 2000s, the EU’s foot-
dragging over Turkey’s accession further diminished the credibility of the 
West. Moreover, there have been many in Turkey who began to 
question whether the NATO and US were still indispensable to the 
country’s foreign and security needs (Oguzlu 2012: 153). Turkey’s 
growing dynamism seems to solidifying the perception that NATO should 
not be allowed to hamper the country’s regional strategies as these have 
been embodied in Ahmet Davutoglu’s ‘strategic depth doctrine’
17
 which 
sees Turkey’s regional relations as an asset used to advance its position 
both independently and in the eyes of the US and Europe (Sozen 2010). 
                                                 
17 The doctrine states that Turkey should feel the responsibility to help put its region in 
order. This is a mission Turkey has inherited from its Ottoman past. According to Oguzlu 
(2012:159-160), “the idea that Turkey needs to fulfill a particular historical mission is very 
much idea-politik. Though the fulfillment of this mission would likely serve Turkey’s 
realpolitik concerns to have stability and security in surrounding regions, the motivating 
factor of Turkey’s various initiatives in this regard is very much identity/ideology driven.” 
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The idea for the AKP leaders is reaching out to the Islamic world as an 
equally – to the West - important element of Turkey’s foreign policy. 
Davutoglu’s main argument has been that Turkey has neglected its 
historic and cultural ties as well as its diplomatic, economic, and political 
relations with the strategically critical Middle Eastern, North African and 
Eurasian regional complexes (Murinson 2006). In the case of the Middle 
East, this major policy shift has been framed in what has been described 
as a ‘neo-ottoman’ platform.
18
 According to Han (2013: 58-59) ‘for the 
AKP, Turkey’s Ottoman heritage introduced both as a sense of historical 
responsibility toward the Middle East and accorded it a sort of 
exceptionalism in the region. When a worldview propagates such 
exceptionalism and claim legitimacy from an ancient heritage, it 
becomes more likely that the regional assessments of decision-makers 
will be flawed’. Moreover, it can lead to a distorted assessment of 
Turkey’s relative power and influence (ibid.: 59). Under the current 
circumstances, Turkish cooperation in regional contingencies should not 
be taken for granted in Washington and elsewhere in the West (Gerges 
2013: 317). Rather, more narrow definitions of interests, and a quest for 
more autonomy of action should be expected.  
The AKP government has been unthreatened by serious political 
opposition for some time. It has allies in the Muslim Brotherhood 
movements in Egypt and beyond (some actually believe that Turkey is 
                                                 
18 This is how, in an AKP major address, Erdogan described his party historic mission: “On the 
historic march of our holy nation, the AK Party signals the birth of a global power and its 
mission for a new world order. This is the centenary of our exit from the Middle East… 
whatever we lost between1911 and 1923, whatever lands we withdrew from, from 2011 to 
2023 we shall once again meet our brothers in those lands”, (Fradkin and Libby 2013). 
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trying to play the role of the Muslim Brotherhood’s big brother)
19
 while 
domestically Prime Minister Erdogan is said to be plotting a personal 
course to an all-powerful presidency in Turkey aiming at further 
consolidating the shift in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. It is no 
surprising then, that according to the results of the German Marshall 
Fund’s 2012 Transatlantic Trends Survey, favorable opinions of the US 
and the EU in Turkey were the lowest among the 16 respondent samples 
with 34 and 36 respectively. The percentage of Turkish respondents who 
think that Asia is more important for Turkish national interests has been 
46 percent, the highest in the survey. Only 42 percent of the surveyed 
Turks approved of Barack Obama’s handling of international politics, the 
worst result with the exception of Russian respondents (26 percent); and 
when it comes to the handling the negotiations with Iran concerning 
their nuclear program, the approval goes down to 24 percent, while 27 
percent of Turks accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons (by far 
the highest score with Russians at 13, the US at 8 and the EU12 at 6 
percent); fighting international terrorism only 32 percent approve 
Barack Obama’s policy with EU12 at 71, US 66 and Russia 38 percent. 
Interestingly, Turkish respondents approve Obama’s handling relations 
with Russia less than the Russians themselves (36 to 38 percent)
20
.  
Implications for US interests and relevant strategies derive from Turkey’s 
evolving democratic course
21
 as well as the foreign policy strategy 
                                                 
19 Samia Berkadi, ‘Gulf States Rethink Ties to Muslim Brotherhood’, El-Khabar, 16 November 
2012, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/11/gulf-states-starting-to-view-muslim. 
20 German Marshall Fund of the United States, ‘Transatlantic Trends 2012’, 
www.transatlantictrends.org.  
21 According to a CFR report on US-Turkish relations (2012: 20) “Both Turkey’s authoritarian 
legacies and the nondemocratic remedies to which the AKP has sometimes resorted during 
its tenure indicate that it is too early to declare Turkey a mature, liberal democracy.” 
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pursued by its current political leadership. Today, Turkish foreign policy 
is more assertive, active and diverse, across its neighborhood. Taking 
into account the current dynamism and growth trajectory of the Turkish 
economy, one cannot ignore the important economic factors related to 
foreign policy activism. There is a growing business class in Turkey willing 
to explore new markets and a government comfortable and willing to 
place greater affinity for the region’s Muslim nations, in order to meet 
the demands of an expanding economy. Turkey’s growing demand for 
energy inputs resulted in increased natural-gas imports from Russia (its 
largest trading partner) and Iran.  
Iran’s growing importance for Ankara both as a source of natural gas and 
a new market for Turkey’s assertive export sector, should not be 
neglected. In the case of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the debate in Ankara 
seems to be mainly political rather than strategic in character. Although, 
“Ankara’s overt rationale has been that by acting as an intermediary 
between Iran and the West, rather than as a strict ally of the West, it will 
acquire more influence over Iran” (Reynolds 2012: v), by refusing to 
support the economic sanctions against Tehran and by identifying Israel 
as part of a nuclear Iran problem, Ankara has been breaking away from 
the dominant assessment of the Iranian nuclear programme in the West, 
and has been running the risk to further polarizing its relations with 
Israel and the US, without actually gaining something from its 
engagement with Tehran. The latter’s regional leadership ambitions and 
policies of dominating Iraq as well as strong support of the Assad regime 
proved to be a major obstacle, and hopes of partnership turned into 
bitter rivalry (Fradkin and Libby 2013). In Syria, Turkey found itself on the 
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other side of the Sunni-Shiite divide, confronted by Iran, Hezbollah and 
the Shiite government in Iraq, drawn, thus, in a sectarian quagmire. 
In light of the above, in the Middle East, US and Turkey while continue 
sharing a fundamental interest in maintaining stability, more than ever 
do differing perceptions, and diverging views and policy choices over key 
issues, namely Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict emerge. Although 
Washington recognizes Turkey’s pivotal role in the region and its value in 
stabilizing US relations with the Muslim world (Gerges 2013: 316), the 
relationship has become more complex and sensitive as Turkey “came to 
border on the US by proxy” (Aydin 2009: 135) adding controversy in the 
Turkish public debate. The policy shift under the AKP has been so 
profound that many observers both Western and Turkish have 
questioned whether Turkey is shifting away from its traditional posture. 
Mustafa Aydin has gone as far as to note “the era of strategic 
partnership has ended” (ibid.: 140). For Reynolds (2012: vi-vii) “there is 
no pretense inside Ankara that its long-term interests are in 
fundamental alignment with those of America”. For Sayari (2013: 136), 
perception about US declining power “have been influential in Turkey’s 
aspirations for greater independence and strategic autonomy”.  
5. Turkish-Israeli relations: Lost in the mist? 
The June 2010 Mavi Marmara ‘flotilla crisis’ and the ‘no’ vote on Iran 
sanctions in the UN Security Council, illustrated Ankara’s shift in 
conducting an active but risky diplomacy across the Muslim and Arab 
world that might produce another slide in its relationship with the US. 
The incident had finally unearthed a significant strategic divergence on 
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the regional security imperatives with the 1990s Turkish-Israeli strategic 
partnership suffering a serious blow. Back in January 2009, the 
relationship had reached a first low turning point as a result of Israel’s 
decision to launch a three-week offensive military operation in the Gaza 
Strip. For some, the clash with Israel has been in profound contradiction 
with the policy principle of ‘zero problems’ and Ankara’s efforts to 
recalibrate the relations with the countries of the Middle East (Reynolds 
2012: vi). For others, it has been a demonstration of vulnerability. While 
the AKP government was clearly keen to position himself as a champion 
of the Palestinian rights, they were, until the end of 2011, rather 
reluctant to stand up for the rights of Syrians, who were being 
massacred in large numbers by the Assad regime just across the border. 
The Turkish government was also distinctly ambivalent about the Libyan 
uprising. After initially opposing NATO military action against the 
Qaddafi regime, Ankara was forced to acknowledge that its political and 
diplomatic leverage with him was quite limited (CFR 2012: 40). 
In the November 2012 Gaza crisis, Prime Minister Erdogan took his 
already confrontational rhetoric to another level, calling Israel a 
“terrorist state” and taking direct aim at the US role in the Middle East. 
This shows, albeit indirectly, that the Gaza crisis has emerged as a new 
complication in US-Turkish relations. On this issue, the two governments 
are clearly on different frequencies. Ankara’s assessment of the Gaza 
developments is naturally different from that of Washington. Erdogan 
thinks of the Gaza issue as Turkey’s own and puts the entire 
responsibility on Israel while backing Hamas. Moreover, with Egypt 
unable to continue as the leader of Israeli-Palestinian talks, Ankara sees 
a vacuum waiting to be filled. The US and Europe see Hamas as a 
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terrorist organization; Turkey affixes this label to Israel.
22
 Erdogan and 
Davutoglu seem convinced that Turkey’s interests lie in the popularity on 
the Arab street and their ability to whip up the crowds against Israel, 
rather than in diplomacy, despite a few feints by the foreign minister in 
that direction. A self-confident and proactive Turkey does not seem to 
believe any longer that its role as mediator means it must maintain an 
equal distance from both sides or be neutral.
23
 For Israel, this is a 
reminder that the Turkish-Israeli relations remain in crisis, mainly 
because Erdogan sees greater leverage for his regional agenda through 
his leadership and alignment with Islamic currents in the Middle East.
24
 
Turkey’s great regional and international weight, however, means that 
diverging from the West could seriously impact on the regional balance 
of power and beyond. With the weakening of Egypt, old aspirations for 
regional primacy can become attractive again. The unraveling of the pro-
Western alliance in the region, with the diluting of Egypt and Turkey’s 
relations with Israel and the relative erosion of the US position, add up 
to the emergence of a regional balance of power that is rather 
unfavorable from Israel’s perspective. (Inbar 2012: 62). Israel has been 
                                                 
22 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Gaza and expressed solidarity with Hamas. 
Ankara demanded that the White House officially recognize Hamas as a direct partner and 
give it assurance on behalf of Israel that if they halt their fire, Israel will do so as well. Sami 
Kohen, ‘Gaza Complicates Turkey-US Relations’, Milliyet, 21 November 2012, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/11/turkey-us-relations-gaza.html. 
23 Tulin Daloglu, ‘Long Way to Normalcy For Turkey and Israel’, 10 April 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/turkey-israel-apology-normalcy.  
24 For Eric Walberg, there are many reasons for the deterioration of the once smooth 
relations between Israel and Turkey: “Firstly both nations have moved away from their 
secular roots – Turkey with the return of Islam as a guiding principle in political life under the 
Justice and Development Part (AKP) in 2002, Israel with the rise of Likud in 1977 ending the 
long reign of Labour. Turkey is naturally returning to its traditional role under the Ottoman 
Caliphate as regional Muslim hegemon, while the Zionised version of Judaism has ended any 
pretense of the Jewish state being interested in making peace with the indigenous Muslims”. 
See Eric Walberg, ‘Turkey-Israel Relations and the Middle East Geopolitical Chessboard. 
Turkey redraws Sykes-Picot’, 30 September 2011, http://www.globalresearch.ca/26867.  
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hardly in a position to shape the environment in which it operates. The 
environment shaped by the peace treaties with Egypt (and Jordan) is 
under great strain as new and unpredictable political forces of Islamic 
inclination become more powerful and legitimate in their rise. With 
Ankara siding with Tehran on the issue of its nuclear programme, the 
task of containing Iran becomes even more difficult. Altogether, the 
‘Arab Spring’ and the deterioration of the Israeli-Turkish relations have 
weakened significantly Israel’s external balancing strategy by creating a 
major strategic vacuum with Turkey’s willingness and ability to play any 
role whatsoever to the betterment of the regional security challenges in 
doubt. The absence of any diplomatic leverage undercuts Turkey’s role 
to one of speech-giver rather than peacemaker.
25
 The Middle East of 
today is much more radical, much more Islamic, much more religious 
and much more hating of Israel. The current perception in the US and 
Israel has been that Ankara’s stance clearly undermines the already slim 
prospects for any meaningful solution and in the name of Islamic 
solidarity Ankara puts the larger security of the region at risk. 
In March 2013, under the tutelage of Barack Obama, Israeli Prime 
Minister Netanyahu issued a formal apology to Erdogan for the flotilla 
raid. The move was celebrated in Ankara but full normalization of 
bilateral relations is still far off. Nobody should expect Turkey-Israeli 
relations to return to the pre-2009 days. An important feature of the 
AKP political culture is to oppose Israel with “anti-Israelism” increasingly 
an eminent feature. It is doubtful whether this will change any time 
soon. Mutual suspicion and lack of confidence between the two will 
                                                 
25 ‘The Gaza Crisis: Will the ceasefire lead to peace?’, The Economist, November 24, 2012. 
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continue for a long time, no matter what is done.
26
 Returning to the high 
days of strategic diplomatic and military cooperation is not very likely. 
Erdogan did not decide to rupture the relationship with Israel because of 
the flotilla raid. There are those who believe that severing ties with Israel 
has been a pre-meditated decision in his course to “become the Sunni 
leader of the Middle East”.
27
 A deep and lasting normalization will 
certainly require a strategic and geopolitical reassessment by all involved 
of the major regional questions like Israeli security, Palestinian 
statehood, Muslim alignments along the Sunni-Shiite axis etc. 
The apology, though, should be seen as a way by the US to pull Turkey 
back in line and on the side of the US and Israel.
28
 The role of Obama has 
been decisive. Washington wants the Israeli-Turkish relations reset both 
because it will enhance Israel’s security and because Turkey is seen as a 
potential facilitator in the idle Peace Process. Improving Turkish-Israeli 
relations and the Peace process are two different issues. But, in the 
context of a new US push, there is definitely a link between the two. 
Washington believes that in restarting the Peace Process Turkey can play 
a major role in smoothing the way by urging Hamas to accept the 
decisions of the Middle East Quartet, to recognize the existence of Israel 
and to abandon terrorism. Also, Turkey could contribute to the 
reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.
29
 Hamas needs all the political 
support it can get and continued backing from Ankara is indispensable 
                                                 
26 Kadri Gursel, ‘Turkey Seeks Ottoman Sphere of Influence’, 3 April 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/turkey-normalization-israel. 
27 Ben Caspit, ‘Israeli-Turkish Reconciliation Not a Done Deal’, 23 April 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/talking-reconciliation-in-ankara.  
28 Tulin Daloglu, ‘Syrian Crisis Play a Major Role in Israeli Apology’, 24 march 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/israel-apology-turkey-flotilla-syrian. 
29 Sami Kohen, ‘US Seek Greater Role for Turkey in Mideast Peace Process’, 9 April 2013, 
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/04/us-turkey-israel-role-mideast-peace-process.  
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for it. In that context, the change in Turkey’s attitude has been 
important, when one thinks that Ankara diluted its position 
considerably: lifting the Israeli embargo and blockade on Gaza appears 
to be forgotten. This shows that mortgaging its relations with Israel to 
the Israeli-Hamas fault line, where Ankara’s influence is limited at best, 
was a major strategic mistake. 
For Israel, the apology is the product of necessity for a country isolated 
in its region and with new rising security anxieties. For the Israeli PM 
Netanyahu, it was a cool-headed strategic decision based on the fact 
that in Syria the crisis and the looming threat are getting worse by the 
minute. Developments in Syria and the possibility of chemical weapons 
falling into the hands of terrorist groups have been prime considerations 
that necessitated an apology and communication with Turkey.
30
 
Although, Erdogan is not likely to renew the close strategic alliance 
between Turkey and Israel, there is definitely scope for a degree of 
normalization. The map of the Middle East is coming apart and the US is 
regrouping in the face of events in Syria. Turkey could derive 
considerable benefit from the rehabilitation of its relations with Israel. 
6. Turkish sectarian engagement in Syria? 
When Turkey found itself deeply involved in the Syrian civil inferno, for 
many this involvement indicated that the Davutoglu ‘doctrine’ is at a 
dead end, with an ill-defined strategy (towards Syria), which has 
backfired as the conflict has descended into sectarian warfare.
31
 Assad 
                                                 
30 Karl Vick, ‘Turkey’s Triumphs’, TIME, 8 April 2013. 
31 Since the mid-2000s the AKP government invested in Assad and in good relations with 
Syria. Ankara was instrumental in bringing the Syrian regime out of international isolation 
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turned to Erdogan’s archenemy after he greatly misjudged ancient 
regional realities and overestimated Turkey’s capacity to influence the 
unfolding developments.
32
 An ambition to elevate Turkey to the status 
of regional game setter, revealed an underestimation of the complex 
regional demographic, religious and political make-up with deep 
sectarian fault-lines.
33
 Ankara, clearly underestimated the resilience of 
the pro-Assad forces and over-estimated the willingness of the US and 
Europe to take the risk to forcing the Assad regime from power.
34
 On 
October 4, 2012 the Turkish military pounded targets inside Syria in 
retaliation for a mortar attack a day earlier that killed five civilians in 
Turkey. Turkey’s Parliament approved a motion the same day that 
authorized further military action against Syria and permitting cross-
border raids. Earlier, in June Syrian forces had shot down a Turkish 
warplane with Ankara refraining from responding.
35
  
Fears of escalation have always been present but the reality is that the 
international community demonstrated no appetite for creating, for 
example, safe havens along the Syria-Turkey border or the sort of no-fly 
zones imposed in Iraq in the 1990s let alone engaging militarily in a 
                                                                                                                                            
after the Hariri assassination in Lebanon and played a major role in 2007 and 2008 with its 
mediation efforts between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights. In April 2009, the two 
states conducted their first ever, joint military exercise to be followed in September by the 
establishment of a ‘Senior Strategic Cooperation Council’. With the uprising in Syria in March 
2011, Ankara tried to counsel Assad to implement social, economic and political reforms 
only to discover the limits of its influence. By November 2011, Erdogan called for Assad to 
step down and openly supported the Syrian opposition. 
32 Semih Idiz, ‘Turkey Miscalculates Syria’, 19 March 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/turkey-davutorlu-syria-policy-failure.  
33 Ibid. 
34 Philip Stephens, ‘Turkey has stumbled on the road to Damascus, Financial Times, Friday, 
October 26, 2012. 
35 ‘Turkey’s Parliament Approves Further Military Action Against Syria’, The New York Times, 
October 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/middleeast/syria.html. 
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violent sectarian conflict such as the one in Syria.
36
 Russia (and China), 
moreover, predictably vetoed a UN Security Council statement 
condemning the Assad regime. Ankara, which is considerably involved in 
the conflict, has felt as if it has been left alone and is frustrated by the 
lack of international support towards more concrete and practical 
action. Any help would be focused on Turkish self-defence, rather than 
addressing the broader Syrian crisis.
37
  
What has been made clear is that the US and Europe lack the willingness 
(and the capability) to weather the geopolitical storms in the Middle East 
and Turkey – or anyone else for that matter – can hope to assume this 
role. And there are no good options in Syria. The fighting has unearthed 
the deep divisions between Sunni, Alawite, Kurd and other smaller 
minority groups. The anger and hatred will be long lasting. The war has 
affected and threatens to gravely destabilize the very fragile status quo 
in Lebanon and Iraq unleashing the winds of sectarian violence there. 
Worse, it has accentuated the Sunni-Shiite antagonisms within Islam and 
it has fueled the confrontations between extremists and mainstream 
Islam across the Arab world (Cordesman 2013). Turkey’s involvement 
was seen as increasingly sectarian, its relations with regional actors were 
strained and its potential for regional leadership undermined 
(Grigoriadis 2012: 1). However, the hand wringing may not be politically 
sustainable if the Syrian crisis were to inexorably expand into Iraq, 
Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Pressure for more 
                                                 
36 The only clear ‘red line’ laid down by the US is the use of chemical weapons. Syria has 
made clear it will not use them unless attacked by an outside power. ‘No one, 
includingTurkey, wants the Syrian conflict to spread’, The Guardian, 4 October 2012. 
37 ‘Syria and Turkey: how long can the world’s great powers sit on their hands?’, The 
Guardian, 4 October 2012. 
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direct, multilateral intervention could be harder to bear. Turkey has a big 
stake in the outcome of the conflict for there are two additional 
problems. There is a big influx of refugees, and, most importantly, there 
is the Kurdish dimension of the crisis.  
The Syria crisis seems to have reopened the ‘Kurdish issue’ and showed 
that it has dimensions beyond being an internal problem of Turkey. It 
has been reported that many of Syria’s Kurds hope to use the civil war as 
an opportunity to carve out an autonomous or even sovereign Kurdish 
region in Syria. For Ankara this is simply unacceptable, for such a 
development could embolden Kurdish separatists elsewhere.
38
 In 2012, 
the PKK launched its most intense campaign against Turkish armed 
forces and the belief in Ankara has been that Syria’s Kurds have been 
assisting the PKK, supported by Assad.
39
 Emergence of Syrian Kurds 
under the leadership of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) — seen as 
Syrian offshoot of the PKK — affixed regional context to Turkey’s Kurdish 
issue. PYD has taken over control of most of Kurdish settlements along 
the 911 kilometers Turkish-Syrian border. In this context Iran, Baath, 
Baghdad, Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq and many other 
elements entered Turkey’s Kurdish equation.  
More than twenty years ago, during the first Gulf War, the notion of a 
divided Iraq became in fact been one of Turkey’s traditional nightmares. 
The fear was that Iraq’s division would result in an independent 
Kurdistan, which would fuel Kurdish separatism in Turkey. That fear 
                                                 
38 Turkey has warned Masoud Barzani, president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional 
Administration, that the autonomous region in northern Iraq would not be applied to Syria 
and Turkey’s stance would be very different than it was in Iraq. See ‘Ankara warns Barzani 
over autonomy in Syria’, Hurriyet Daily News, November 3-4, 2012. 
39 Amanda Paul, ‘Turkey gets tough on Syria’, Sunday’s Zaman, October 7, 2012. 
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appears to have receded with the economic and political ties that have 
developed between KRG in Arbil and Ankara. Today, the threat is seen to 
be coming less from the Iraqi Kurds, and more from Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki and his overtly sectarian policies, which favor Iraq’s 
majority Shiites against the minority Sunnis.
40
 This has resulted in 
Ankara’s providing unconditional support and refuge to Iraq’s Sunni 
Deputy President Tariq al Hashimi, who faces a death sentence in 
Baghdad for allegedly setting murderous squads on Shiites in the past. 
Erdogan’s strong criticisms of Maliki, and Ankara’s open support of Iraqi 
Sunnis, in turn, reflect Turkey’s sectarian sympathies, a fact that is also 
seen in Ankara’s approach to the Syrian civil war. According to Tocci 
(2013: 2), “Turkish policies are de facto bolstering the KRG’s drift 
towards independence”. 
Furthermore, Turkey’s increasing cooperation with Iraqi Kurds in the 
strategic energy sector, which is developing over Baghdad’s head, has 
also fueled Maliki’s anger towards Turkey. Kurds claim that the oil-rich 
city of Kirkuk is part of their territory, a contention rejected by Baghdad, 
which has already resulted in a military standoff between the sides. 
Given Turkey’s deepening relations with the KRG, its continued support 
for Iraqi Sunnis, and differences over Syria, tensions between Ankara 
and Baghdad will probably continue to fester for some time. Meanwhile, 
                                                 
40 One of the principle results of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was that it released the Shiite 
genie out of the Middle East bottle. Clearly, in retrospect, the implication of Iraq’s 
demographic makeup — in which the Shiites constitute the overwhelming majority — was 
not considered sufficiently by the Bush administration at the time. The result, with foreign 
Sunni Jihadist groups pitching in to turn the country into a sectarian bloodbath, is an 
increasingly polarized Iraq, which has come to the brink of division along ethnic and 
sectarian lines. The U.S. invasion of Iraq also worked to predominantly Shiite Iran’s 
advantage, providing Tehran the opportunity to expand its regional influence by playing the 
sectarian card. 
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with Iraqi Sunnis taking to the street now to protest Maliki, and overall 
sectarian and ethnic tensions rising, uncertainty over Iraq’s future 
becomes greater by the day. 
In this geopolitical juncture, Erdogan realized that Turkey needs to move 
forward and he engaged in direct talks with Ocalan and PKK European 
representatives. It has not been an easy decision but it has to a large 
degree been the result of intense geopolitical pressures and compelling 
regional circumstances. Deepening trade, energy and diplomatic 
relations with KRG, hostility with Baghdad, the need to exert influence 
on Syria’s autonomy-seeking Kurds have been critical determinants.  
Also, Turkey’s open hostility against the Syrian regime resulted in a 
convergence between the PKK’s military wing based at Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
Kandil Mountains and the Tehran-Damascus axis. The PKK put itself 
squarely into the equation of the Iran-Syria axis with the support of 
Russia following 2011. Just as Iran and Syria have become an “ace card” 
for the PKK, the PKK has become more valuable for Iran and Syria than 
ever before. In Syria, the PKK and the PYD have placed themselves 
between the regime and the opposition, if somewhat nearer to the 
regime. They have entered a period when they willl be most reluctant to 
disarm, becoming regional players, far beyond a mere security nuisance 
for Turkey.  
The prospect of having to deal with an increasingly assertive Kurdish 
statehood-seeking population in its borders left Ankara with one viable 
strategic option: to work with them. It became a strategic imperative to 
neutralize the PKK by disengaging it from the Tehran-Damascus alliance. 
Turkey had no real leverage to dissuade the PKK leaders at their Kandil 
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Mountains headquarters adjacent to Iran. Only Ocalan could exercise 
real influence.
41
 On 21 March 2013, a cease-fire came into effect. If the 
talks proceed as planned and a permanent settlement is reached, this 
could change the dynamics both domestically and regionally.  
The Syrian crisis will continue to be the source of major headaches for 
Ankara, which has been consistently wrong in its predictions. First, there 
was a miscalculation on how long Assad would last and what he is 
capable of doing. Second, Turkey also miscalculated Assad’s isolation. 
Ankara truly believed that Assad’s supporters could not provide anything 
else but moral support and the West, under the leadership of the United 
States and Turkey, would easily topple the regime. Yet, Iran turned out 
to be extremely generous when it came to providing military and 
economic support to Assad. Ankara underestimated Moscow’s political 
support to Assad and the importance it attached to the survival of the 
regime. Finally, Turkey’s unrestrained confidence in the Syrian National 
Council, Free Syrian Army and other armed groups fighting Assad 
became a serious nuisance for Ankara. Turkish diplomacy relentlessly 
defended Jabhat al-Nusra against the concerns and criticism of the West. 
Despite the risks of letting them loose, these groups were granted 
special border passage privileges.
42
  
The point is that neither Erdogan, nor Davutoglu — or anyone else for 
that matter — can say when Assad will go. Moreover, since Assad’s 
departure doesn’t automatically mean stability, the security anxieties for 
Turkey are likely to persist during the transition period. This increases 
                                                 
41 Cengiz Candar, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Initiative in Regional Context’, 7 April 2013, www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/syria-iraq-aspects-turkey.  
42 Deniz Zeyrek, ‘Turkey's Syria Policy:  Success or Bankruptcy?’, Radikal, 26 May 2013. 
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the chances of an international arrangement brokered by the US and 
Russia that might have Assad as some kind of actor, at least for some 
brief period. While Assad’s remaining in power in any way is a non-
starter for Turkey, the Erdogan government has come around to 
accepting that elements of the current Baathist regime will have to be 
incorporated into a transitional government
43
 in order to maintain that 
country’s unity. This unity has become vital for Ankara given that a 
division of Syria will have divisive consequences for Iraq as well. 
Protracted chaos, sectarian violence and a resulting black security hole 
across the border, amount to a profound deterioration of the strategic 
environment in which Turkey has been aspiring to play a major role, and 
is bound to affect the nature of Turkey’s relations with the US and the 
West in general (Lesser 2012: 2). Not so long ago, Turkey was welcoming 
the US retreat from the regional scene. With the Syrian conflict, it is 
angered by the US and NATO refusal or inability to intervene
44
 or to even 
aid Turkey
45
. What should have been clear is that the Obama 
administration does not view US vital interests as involved and hence, at 
                                                 
43 Erdogan’s visit to washington in May 2013, marked a so-called “synchronization” of Syrian 
policy between the US and Turkey. Representatives of the Assad government and the 
opposition will meet at a conference in Geneva (the so-called Geneva II). The goal would be 
to agree on a cease-fire and a transitional government. If the Assad side flees the table in 
this process, then Russia will be pressed to support sanctions at the Security Council. While 
the Geneva process continues, direct humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees will be 
increased. Covert weapons and ammunition support to the Syrian opposition will continue 
and necessary measures will be taken to prevent the further strengthening of internationally 
linked terror groups like Jabhat al-Nusra. Zeyrek, ‘Turkey's Syria Policy’. 
44 The best the US has offered is logistical and intelligence support for the rebels and 
humanitarian aid for the refugees. Washington has indicated that it would not supply 
sophisticated weapons fearing that these would fall into the hands of the Islamic militants 
who have flocked to the cause of the rebels. 
45 Turkey lacks important defence systems for deployment against other regional actors, 
such as Syria. The US has been very reluctant to export the necessary equipment, such as 
Super Cobras, not to mention high-tech unmanned weapons like Predators. See ‘Ankara and 
Washington: What is the problem?’, Today’s Zaman, 2 November 2012, 
http://todayszaman.com/news/296454 
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the time of writing, Washington had no desire to intervene militarily. 
Fears of escalation are quite strong and the last think Obama wants is 
another Iraq-type engagement by the US (Gerger 2013: 310). The US 
does not have the basic tools necessary for a successful escalation as it 
lacks the capability on the ground to ensure that the prime beneficiaries 
of arming the opposition in Syria will not be the regime’s jihadist 
opponents, like Jabhat al-Nusra, who are “natural” US enemies. 
Estimates of the size of the Jabhat al-Nusra group vary but they may 
account for up to a quarter of the opposition forces in Syria.
46
 
Although there can be no certainty as to where Syria is going
47
, as no 
one seems to have a clear road map as to how to end the bloodshed, 
what the crisis has made clear is, first, that the longer the Assad regime 
lasts, the worse things are likely to get. As Cordesman (2013) noted, 
“every current element of the present conflict is having a steadily more 
crippling effect and is more polarizing both within Syria and the region 
around it”. Second, the crisis has been a manifestation of the fact that 
Turkey “has neither the power not the strength to sustain a care role in 
Eastern Mediterranean”. Rather, it remains “a plausible yet volatile actor 
on the edge of the subsystems of continental Europe and the Middle 
East” (Robins 2013: 382). Turkish policy towards Syria has been 
“misconceived”, personal and ideology-driven, and as such unstable. 
                                                 
46 Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis, head of the U.S. Central Command, testified on 5 March 
2013 at a hearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that the current situation 
in Syria is too complex to provide lethal aid to opposition forces. He noted that the rebels 
remain fractured, and said it is becoming increasingly clear that some of these factions are 
connected with al-Qaeda. See ‘Arming the Syrians continues to be a bad idea’, 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/287685-arming-the-syrians-
continues-to-be-a-bad-idea#ixzz2NVNETHKq, 12 March 2013. 
47 For an interesting discussion on Syria in late 2011, see Chatham House (2011), ‘Scenarios 
for Syria’, MENA Programme: Meeting Summary, www.chathamhouse.org/mena.  
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Ankara chose to ignore the fact that the Syrian civil war has been “much 
more about subsystemic attempts by each of the region’s two main 
blocs – the US-led Sunni camp, incorporating the Arab Gulf, and the 
Iranian-led, predominantly Shii, so-called ‘rejectionist faction’ supported 
by Iraq and Hezbiollah – to improve its position at its rival’s expense” 
(ibid.: 392-3).  
7. Conclusion  
Despite all the joy that came with the ‘Arab Spring’ popular uprisings in 
2011, the Arab Middle East remains a very unstable and unpredictable 
region where the multidimensional crisis cannot be expected to produce 
viable, functional and more democratic regimes anytime soon. Rather, 
weak states will continue to struggle both domestically and in the 
foreign policy conduct (Inbar 2012: 59). Also, there is no guarantee that 
the new regimes would be less war-prone or less autocratic, hence the 
risk of even greater turmoil has not decreased. Moreover, following the 
US withdrawal from Iraq, the partial vacuum left the door open and 
allowed more room for regional players to assert themselves. Such a 
prospect means that Washington might need to reassess its overall 
Eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern strategy. A region embroiled 
in Syrian-type conflict is not the foundation for regional power and 
security projection it once was. Strained relations with Egypt and Turkey 
will complicate US strategic calculations and stability seeking (Alterman 
and Malka 2012: 122-123).  
These realities certainly help to redefine Turkish-US relations as they 
have recast Turkey’s regional role and its relations with Syria and Iran. 
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The fact that Turkey is a part of a very much-unchartered regional 
security complex means that US policy towards Ankara cannot but 
remain a subset of Washington’s overall Middle East policy. However, 
significant differences in perceptions and policies emerged since the late 
2000s that have still not been cast away and will most probably not for 
some time. The AKP’s foreign policy agenda seems to reflect a rather 
sectarian approach, with emphasis on Muslim solidarity, engagement 
with the Middle East and embrace of actors hostile to the US, the West 
and Israel. This policy has been popular in the domestic arena as well as 
consistent with a worldview that sees Turkey the leader of Sunni Islam 
and the Muslim Brotherhood regimes. It has been a policy, though, that 
run into the political and social realities of the region. Syria turned out to 
be the crisis on which Turkey’s Middle East engagement policy 
foundered in ways unexpected by the AKP leadership. Success has not 
been forthcoming and a process of redefinition may be underway. The 
gap between grand designs and the regional realities of “ferocious 
rivalries and inflexible dogma” is nothing but narrowing, while there are 
others (like Egypt) who will again try to lay claim to the leadership of an 
Arab world increasingly de-secularizing (Gerges 2013).  
What this paper has tried to suggest is that US interests in Turkey are 
engaged in important ways: The US has a stake in the evolution of 
Turkey as an actor whose condition influences - to a point - the future of 
regions that matter to Washington and although Turkish-US relations 
had suffered serious setbacks, the US cannot afford to let the situation 
deteriorate further, as long as Turkey “remains a western-oriented 
stable country in a very problematic neighborhood” (Aydin 2009: 141) 
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Although the potential for regional security cooperation remains 
substantial, with Turkey emerging as a more independent regional 
player - at times even at cross-purposes with the US - and a more 
capable security actor in its own right, strategic convergence, though, 
requires new thinking. While Ankara and Washington continue to take 
compatible approaches to policy in some key areas (e.g. the Balkans, the 
Black Sea and the Caucasus region), on issues of current strategic priority 
- Iraq, Iran, Syria, Egypt, the Middle East peace process and potentially 
Russia – differences in perception and approach are not easy to dismiss, 
and interpretations of security concerns do not always coincide. 
Although Turkish and American interests are broadly convergent, and 
the bilateral relationship remains heavily focused on security, rising 
levels of distrust has further fueled Turkish security concerns as far as 
the pivotal role of the US in the region while for Washington, Turkey’s 
strategic importance in the Middle East might be diminishing. 
Although US matters to most major security policy issues that confronts 
Turkey today and in the years ahead, Turkey matters to the US primarily 
as part of a wider regional security system. As the Americans set global 
imperatives with regional applications, of utmost importance will be the 
search between Turkey and the US for a balance among strategic 
objectives and tactical commands for the future of the region. 
Agreement in the first one (strategic objectives) by no means implies 
compatibility in the second (tactical commands). In this respect, even in 
areas where both have an interest, Turkey might not be the most likely 
agent of change, especially since there is a clear lack of willingness, at 
least for now.  
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